Introduction
Depressed patients may lack insight into their own condition which would enable them to make a valid informed treatment decision yet not be so disturbed that they can be regarded as totally lacking the capacity either to consent or refuse.
In this article we describe a patient who refused essential treatment. There existed grounds on which treatment could be enforced and equally persuasive grounds for respecting his wishes. The legal and ethical aspects of this dilemma are discussed and finally how the dilemma was resolved therapeutically. Case history MJ, a fifty-seven-year-old retired garage owner, was brought to a hospital out-patient department by friends (somewhat reluctantly) because his diabetes was poorly controlled. For eight weeks following the departure of his wife he had 'let himself go'. He no longer read the paper, he spent his days despondent because his wife did not return and occasionally he went looking for her. He stopped taking his oral hypoglycaemics and, a week prior to his referral, two toes on his left foot went black. The examining doctor recommended amputation of these toes, a procedure he flatly refused. He declined any in-patient treatment insisting that he be taken home. The doctor referred him to a liaison psychiatrist -suggesting that he had a depressive illness which prevented him from appreciating the seriousness of his condition.
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Background
MJ had lived in the area for many years. He never knew his father, but lived with his mother until she died. As a child he had a number of neurotic traits including encopresis and school refusal. He was educated and left school at sixteen to work in the car trade. He was successful in this, eventually owning his own garage. He developed diabetes in his late forties, and despite treatment, ocular complications. He was sighted, and in spite of his illness led a full life. He had no children or other dependants from his ten-year marriage. His wife left following a row in the context of an already dependent and 'clinging' relationship.
His mental state reflected much of this recent tragedy although he was alert, co-operative and orientated. He complained of disturbed sleep, loss of interest, self-blame and general self-neglect. He was not suicidal, but merely wanted to be left alone -not to die, but he would rather not be bothered by all the fuss.
His appraisal of his condition was accurate. He recognised that the toes of his foot were gangrenous and knew that this would worsen if untreated. He was tired, fed up and simply did not want the offered treatment. He accepted that he might die, but recognised that this would not be immediate. (He had dry gangrene of the toes and it was estimated that he would be septacaemic in forty-eight hours.)
The clinical impression was of a man with much to be depressed about. His wife had left him, he found coping (without her) very difficult. He had a chronic disease. He was suffering from a depressive illness and, in refusing the offered treatment was at risk of dying.
The question for clinical management was whether he was to be detained under the Mental Health Act to allow treatment of his mental state (and coincidentally any physical complications of this), or whether his refusal of treatment was 'informed' and he was capable of making this judgement.
In practical terms, obtaining a second opinion by asking relatives or friends for their views provides additional information and probably reduces the chances of legal complications. However, the underlying uncertainties of informed consent and enforced treatment persist. Though these principles may be stated with a fair degree of clarity, in everyday clinical practice it is not always easy to decide whether an otherwise lucid adult who is deeply depressed has the insight and judgement to enable him to give a valid consent to treatment. His judgement and ability to see things in perspective may seem impaired or distorted to the doctor, but the question is, is his mental capacity so impaired that the doctor is entitled to override a decision to refuse treatment. The doctor is not as of right entitled to substitute his decision for that of the patient simply because he does not agree with it even if the outcome will be death. He will have to be sure on clinical grounds that the patient lacks the necessary capacity to make an informed decision, at least at the relevant time. If the patient's mental condition is likely to improve to a point where he can make an informed decision, wherever possible the doctor must hold his hand and wait for it to be forthcoming. Of course there may be situations where there is very little time left for manoeuvre and where undue delay will render treatment ineffective and/or during which the patient's condition is certain to deteriorate even to the point where he may die. The law has never pretended to be watertight and grey areas leave doctors free to make clinical decisions that may later be challenged in court.
Ethical considerations
By and large doctors (and other health professionals) are more likely to be guided in their decision-making by conscience (or what seems to them to be the right course) than by any legal constraints. In discharging that duty (or exercising clinical freedom) there emerge conflicting moral principles. Four moral perspectives can be applied in this example: 1) Rights theory: All living people have rights. These rights include the right to medical treatment, the right to be resuscitated when unconscious and the right to do what they want within the limitation that it does not interfere with another person's rights. The conflict here arises with the patient's refusal of treatment (his right) versus the right of others to give treatment when deemed necessary by a doctor. In this perspective the issue of overruling rights rests on whether a person's opinion is expressed when he is competent to form such an opinion. 2) Virtue theory: Virtuousness is the desirable quality -that is the fair person is the moral champion. In this perspective to be fair means making a just decision (though what this is remains unknown until a court has ruled). The conflict here arises because being fair may not be doing good, ie making the sick person well. Benevolent action by the doctor may not be virtuous.
3) Commonsense morality: This refers to something we are all familiar with. Its origins are within ourselves and amount to a moral perspective we have been brought up with. In this example the conflict arises between beneficence and autonomy. It is, in this paradigm, wrong to go against somebody's wishes. As with the Rights theory, the question of competence arises. Is this person competent to make requests which could be interpreted as his right? 4) Utilitarianism: This perspective stresses outcome.
Providing that the result increases welfare (or is A more acceptable model requires a balance between the decision that has to be made and an individual's capacity to make it (6) . An important decision such as the refusing of a life-saving operation has to be balanced with the mental competence of the person making it. This model's advantage is that it avoids becoming limited to one aspect of the problem. For MJ the question is not, is he suffering from a mental disorder that renders him incompetent? Instead the question is, does he fully understand what refusing to have the operation means or is his refusal part of a depressive desire for death?
Although this latter question may be unanswerable it can guide questioning so that some understanding of the refusal to co-operate with treatment is acquired. In this example part of the refusal may have been a desire to involve his next of kin (his estranged wife); there may have been a hope that refusing treatment would have engineered her return.
Clearly this can only be determined through establishing a relationship with the patient based on trust and honest disclosure. This aspect of the professional relationship -based on the fiduciary principle -is paramount in assessing the ability to decide autonomously. Furthermore, through the partnership process persuasion can influence the decision. This process will of course take time and is often successful in making a person re-appraise his or her decision. Its value should not be underrated.
A test for competency? Competence is a legal judgement. In English law fitness to plead and testamentary capacity are both forms of mental competence. The court requires certain mental abilities of the accused (in the case of fitness to plead) so that it is satisfied he understands the proceedings. These legal guidelines can then be enacted by psychiatrists making the assessment of that person's ability to plead. As such they are exceedingly useful.
In the United States, the right to refuse treatment has received more attention. One writer (7) Any enquiry after the event is likely to be biased as opinions polarise with the exigency of the situation. A further problem arises in asking the carers concerned to accept a decision: Suppose a standard ofcompetency is met, could we live with the therapeutic decision this binds us to?
This discomfort underlies criticism of a test for competence. Any test needs to be valid and reliable. At present there is no yardstick to assess these functions. This is Sir Douglas Black's view (9) . Guidelines, he suggests, lead to restrictive and inflexible practice; at worst a checklist which abrogates a doctor from his professional responsibilities, at best a limitation on allowing a doctor to practise his art in an 'ethically aware' manner. This argument is persuasive. The clinician faced with the dilemma described above must make difficult choices; these dilemmas are frequent and as professionals we should be able to shoulder the responsibilities but, he adds, we have a right to know why these problems are difficult. A strong advocate for ethical education, he makes this, at the present time, a more attractive route. But it hangs in the balance. If doctors bow to the pressure of defensive medicine, then a test for competency will soon become necessary. For now we act according to moral principles inculcated through experience and education.
Therapeutic outcome
In deciding not to enforce treatment wide consultation was undertaken. It was felt that MJ was able to understand the consequences of refusing treatment even if his argument for not being treated was difficult to see. Having decided this a therapeutic relationship was maintained by offering further care outside the hospital. (It is worth noting that rejection of therapeutic endeavours are sometimes taken personally by a doctor, resulting in a rejection of further care for the patient.)
The following day MJ agreed to come back to hospital where he underwent a surgical operation. He left hospital six weeks later, considerably improved both mentally and physically.
Conclusion
A clinical example in which autonomy was respected and treatment was eventually implemented is far easier to report than ifin respecting autonomy the patient had died. It does however highlight how moral priciples influence medical practice and decision-making. In these situations a course of action rather than the tradition of diagnosis and treatment becomes paramount. Doctors 
